The distribution of unemployment duration in a general equilibrium matching model with spell-dependent unemployment bene…ts displays a time-varying exit rate. Building on Semi-Markov processes, we obtain an expression for the aggregate unemployment rate under endogenous heterogeneous search e¤ort. Structural estimation using a German micro-data set (SOEP) allows us to discuss the e¤ects of a recent unemployment bene…t reform (Hartz IV). The reform reduced unemployment by only 0.3%. Contrary to general beliefs, we …nd that workers as a whole gain even though the long-term unemployed lose. The reason is the rise in the wage caused by more vacancies per unemployed worker.
Introduction
Continental European unemployment is notorious for its persistence. France, Italy and Germany have had rising unemployment rates from the 1960s up to 2000 and even onward. There seems to be a consensus now that a combination of shocks and institutional arrangements lies at the origin of these high unemployment rates (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998, 2007a, b; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) . Neither institutions nor shocks alone explain the rise in unemployment: institutions have always been there but unemployment has not (at least not at this level) and shocks have hit many countries but not all countries have high unemployment rates. The step from this shock-institutions insight towards …nding a solution to the European unemployment problem seems to be short: As shocks will not go, we need to address the institutions.
A common suggestion to …ght unemployment is to reduce long and generous unemployment bene…ts. This raises other questions, however: Should one reduce the length and level of unemployment bene…ts in order to reduce unemployment? One seems to be faced by a classic e¢ ciency-equity trade-o¤. While reducing unemployment per se is bene…cial, income of the unemployed and the insurance mechanism implicit in unemployment bene…ts should not be neglected.
We examine qualitatively and quantitatively the employment and welfare e¤ects of a policy reform which reduces the length and level of unemployment bene…ts. We use Germany as an example of a continental European country for three reasons. First, the unemployment rate in Germany has been rising for many decades, just as e.g. in France or Italy. Second, the German unemployment bene…t system has a two-tier structure which is typical for many OECD countries. Third, the so-called "Hartz IV reform" implemented in January 2005 comprises both the reduction of bene…t levels and the cut of the duration of entitlement. Reforms of this type were undertaken in many other OECD countries as well (OECD, 2004) .
The reform did not change the level of unemployment insurance (UI) payments. Unemployment assistance (UA) payments, formerly proportional to net earnings before the job loss, were replaced by a uniform bene…t level, however. The e¤ect of this new rule on the income of long-term unemployed workers was ambiguous. There were unemployed whose bene…t payments were lower before 2005 than after the reform, mainly unemployed workers from the low wage sector. Those were the "winners"of the reform (47 percent of long-term unemployed). On the other hand, there were also long-term unemployed with relatively high wages before entering unemployment. These were a¤ected negatively by the new law and their income has dropped (53 percent of long-term unemployed). Despite the fraction of "winners"and "losers"is roughly equal, the gain of the winners has turned out to be lower than the loss of the losers leading to a loss of the average worker of a bit more than 7% due to Hartz IV (Blos and Rudolph, 2005; OECD, 2007) . The reform also adjusted, for workers who entered unemployment from February 2006 onward, the maximum duration of entitlement to UI payments. It was (almost) uniformly reduced to 12 months (formerly, 15 months was the average).
At …rst sight, the reforms seem to have worked. 2 The reported unemployment rate dropped between January 2005 and January 2007 from 12.3% to 10.2%. On the other hand, growth rates in Germany were (for German standards) fairly high. While the German economy shrank in 2003, it has recovered since then and probably also created new jobs. The real GDP grew by 0.8 percent in 2005 and by 2.9 percent in 2006. The question therefore arises whether the drop in unemployment can be credited to the reform. It is also a priori unclear how strongly various groups were a¤ected by the reform. Did utility of the (shortand long-term) unemployed or employed workers rise or fall? Did …rms gain from the reform? What about social welfare?
We provide answers by using a model which combines various strands of the literature and adds some new and essential features. We employ a general equilibrium matching framework and extend the standard text-book model for time-dependent unemployment bene…ts, endogenous e¤ort, risk-averse households, an exogenous "spell-e¤ect" and SemiMarkov features. Each of these extensions is crucial. Unemployment bene…ts in our model need to depend on the length of the unemployment spell as this is a feature of basically all OECD unemployment bene…t systems. Letting agents optimally choose their e¤ort to …nd a job, we can analyze the incentive e¤ects of (reforms of) the unemployment bene…t system on the search intensity. Risk-averse households are required as we also want to evaluate insurance e¤ects. The spell-e¤ect allows us to obtain -depending on how fast it sets inrising (up to some upper limit), falling or hump-shaped exit rates. Finally, tools from the Semi-Markov literature are required as this allows us to deduce the aggregate unemployment rate from individual search. We can thereby compute macro e¢ ciency e¤ects resulting from micro incentives.
We solve this model numerically by looking at Bellman equations as di¤erential equations. This gives us solutions which are as accurate as numerical precision and which do not require us to approximate the model in any way. Optimal behaviour implies an exit rate into employment which is a function of the time spent in unemployment. We thereby obtain a ‡exible enough endogenous distribution of unemployment duration which we employ for structural estimation of model parameters. Estimation by maximum likelihood is then (relatively) straightforward.
The main theoretical contribution of our analysis is the explicit treatment of the SemiMarkov nature of optimal individual behaviour due to the presence of spell-dependent unemployment bene…ts: Optimal exit rates not only depend on whether the individual is unemployed (the current state of the worker) but also on how long an individual has been unemployed. While this Semi-Markov aspect has been known for a while, it has not been fully exploited so far in the search literature. Using results from the applied mathematics literature, we obtain analytic expressions for individual employment probabilities contingent on current employment status and duration of unemployment. They allow us to compute aggregate unemployment rates using a law of large numbers in our pure idiosyncratic risk economy. Given this link from optimal individual behaviour to aggregate outcomes, we can analyze the distribution and e¢ ciency e¤ects of changes in level and length of unemployment bene…ts.
The main empirical contribution is the careful modelling of exit rates into employment. Individual incentives due to falling unemployment bene…ts imply more search e¤ort and therefore higher exit rates over time. Empirical evidence shows, however, that exit rates tend to fall -at least after some initial increase over the …rst 3-4 months of unemployment. We therefore combine individual incentive e¤ects with an exogenous time-decreasing spelle¤ect and with unobserved heterogeneity. As is well known, the latter implies inter alia falling aggregate exit rates even though individual exit rates are rising. Structural estimation then establishes the importance of the time-e¤ect and the unobserved heterogeneity e¤ect. We …nd that the model can replicate empirical stylized facts of …rst rising and then falling exit rates.
The main policy contribution is our emphasis and structural estimation of the tradeo¤ between insurance and incentive e¤ects of labour market policies. The degree of riskaversion -crucial for understanding the insurance e¤ect -is jointly estimated with exit rates and the spell-e¤ect (and other model parameters). A comparative static analysis using the estimated version of the theoretical model then allows us to derive precise predictions about the employment and distribution e¤ects of changes in the length and level of unemployment bene…ts.
Providing a short preview of our results, we …nd that the reform did decrease the unemployment rate -which is the desirable e¤ect -but only by 0.3% -which is disappointing. Very much to our surprise, we also …nd that the reform increased wages and decreased pro…ts. Usually, one would expect that a reduction of alternative income reduces equilibrium wages. While this channel is present in our setup as well, the general equilibrium e¤ect of a rise in the number of vacancies per unemployed worker overcompensates the …rst e¤ect -wages rise when bene…ts fall. The mechanism is very simple: lower bene…ts induce the unemployed to search harder which in turn induces …rms to open more vacancies per unemployed worker. As wages rise, pro…ts fall.
This rise in wages is also the reason why the reform is social welfare increasing. The uninterested worker (behind the veil of ignorance) experiences a rise in expected utility. This is not due to a better insurance mechanism cause by the reform. In fact, the insurance mechanism is worsened when unemployment bene…ts are reduced. The rise in expected utility is entirely due to the general equilibrium increase in the wage. The only drawback of the reform is that the long-term unemployed workers lose. A Pareto-improving reform would have been more desirable.
Our paper is related to various strands in the literature. From a theoretical perspective, we build on the search and matching framework of Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985) , recently surveyed by Rogerson et al. (2005) . Time-dependent unemployment bene…ts and endogenous e¤ort have been originally analyzed by Mortensen (1977) in a one-sided job search model. Equilibrium search and matching models include Cahuc and Lehman (2000) , Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) .
3 These models, however, are less powerful than our model in explaining the anticipation e¤ect of the reduction in bene…ts, as exit rates within each bene…t regime are constant. There also exists a substantial literature that studies optimal insurance allowing for an arbitrary time path of unemployment bene…t payments (Shavell and Weiss, 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Shimer and Werning, 2007) . Our focus is more of a positive nature trying to understand the welfare e¤ects of existing systems which have a simpler bene…t structure than the ones resulting from an optimization approach. We also allow for an unlimited number of transitions between employment and unemployment and undertake a general equilibrium analysis as in Moscarini (2005) . 4 From an empirical perspective, we estimate a parametric duration model (Lancaster, 1990) in which time dependence of the hazard function due to time-dependent bene…ts is fully described by the equilibrium solution of our theoretical model. Econometric models with time-dependent bene…ts were originally estimated by van den Berg (1990) and Ferrall (1997) .
5 Van den Berg et al. (2004) and Abbring et al. (2005) extend the setting by 3 Albrecht and Vroman (2005) and Coles and Masters (2007) also have time-dependent unemployment payments but they do not analyze the implications for individual e¤ort. Albrecht and Vroman focus on the equilibrium wage dispersion and ine¢ cient job rejection. Coles and Masters model aggregate uncertainty implying implicit transfers between …rms and the stabilizing e¤ect this has on the unemployment rate over the cycle.
4 Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) do consider a general equilibrium model, but their setting is restricted to time-invariant bene…ts only.
5 See also Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) for literature review on nonstationary empirical models.
introducing time dependence due to monitoring and sanctions. In contrast to our model, this literature deals with one-sided job search, which makes application of its estimates in a general equilibrium analysis rather di¢ cult. In addition to that, focus on the incentive e¤ect in is only partial (van den Berg et al., 2004; Abbring et al., 2005) and insurance e¤ect remains largely unaddressed. There also exists a larger empirical equilibrium search literature that deals with unemployment bene…t heterogeneity (Bontemps et al., 1999) , heterogeneity in workers abilities (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) and heterogeneity in workers value of nonparticipation (Flinn, 2006) . Unlike in our model, however, neither of these contributions views heterogeneity as being a result of non-stationary unemployment bene…ts. Finally, Semi-Markov methods are taken from the applied mathematical literature, see e.g. Kulkarni (1995) or Corradi et al. (2004) .
The structure of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical model, institutional setting, behaviour of supply and demand sides and the combination of both in economic welfare. Section 3 describes the equilibrium properties of the model. Section 4 illustrates the structural estimation and the underlying data. The simulation results and the evaluation of the institutions reforms are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We use a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type matching model and extend it for timedependent unemployment bene…ts, endogenous e¤ort, risk-averse households and an exogenous spell-e¤ect. To solve it, we use Semi-Markov tools. The separation rate for jobs is constant and there is no search on the job. We focus on steady states in our analysis. Households are ex-ante identical but endogenously heterogenous in their unemployment duration.
Production, bene…ts and employment
The economy has a work force of exogenous constant size N: Employment is endogenous and given by L and the number of unemployed amounts to N L: Firms produce under perfect competition on the goods market and each worker-…rm match produces output A, which is constant. The production process of the worker and the …rm can be interrupted by exogenous causes which occur according to a time-homogenous Poisson process with a constant arrival rate .
Unemployed workers receive UI bene…ts b U I and UA bene…ts b U A . Bene…ts are modelled to re ‡ect institutional arrangements in many European countries. One of the most important features is the dependence of UI bene…ts on the unemployment spell. Workers with a spell s shorter than s (say one year) receive UI bene…ts b U I , afterwards, they receive b U A ,
We assume b U I > b U A 0. Bene…ts can be paid either at a …xed level or proportional to previous income.
An unemployed worker …nds a job according to a time -inhomogeneous Poisson process with arrival rate (:) : This rate will also be called the job-…nding rate, hazard rate or exit rate (into employment). We allow this rate to depend on e¤ort (s (t)) an individual exerts to …nd a job. E¤ort today in t depends on the length s (t) this individual has been spending in unemployment since his last job. The spell increases linearly in time and starts in t 0 where the individual has lost the job, i.e. s (t) = t t 0 . An individual whose duration of unemployment spell s (t) exceeds the length of entitlement to UI bene…ts s (i.e. s (t) t 0 + s) will be called a long-term unemployed.
In addition to e¤ort, the exit rate of an individual will also depend on aggregate labour market conditions and on something which, for simplicity, we call a spell-e¤ect. Labour market conditions are captured by labour market tightness that di¤ers across steady states, V = (N L). We assume that e¤ort and tightness are multiplicative: no e¤ort implies permanent unemployment and no vacancies imply that any e¤ort is in vain. The spell-e¤ect captures all factors exogenous to the individual which a¤ects her exit rate into employment. This can include stigma (Vishvanath, 1989) , ranking (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994) and gains or losses in individual search productivity. We denote this e¤ect by (s) : Assuming that a stigma becomes worse the longer s; we would expect (s) to fall in s: Summarizing, the exit rate will be of the form ( (s (t)) ; (s)) :
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There is a long discussion in the literature whether aggregate falling exit rates are due to a time e¤ect (as modeled here by (s)) or due to unobserved heterogeneity (Kiefer and Neumann, 1981 , Flinn and Heckman, 1982 and, non-parametrically, Heckman and Singer, 1984 , van den Berg and van Ours, 1996 . We take unobserved heterogeneity into account in our empirical part and discuss its e¤ects there.
The outcome of our time-varying exit rate will be an endogenous distribution of unemployment duration. Its density is given by (e.g. Ross, 1996, ch. 2)
This density will be crucial later for various purposes including the estimation of model parameters. It is endogenous to the model, as exit rate ( (s (t)) ; (s)) follows from the optimizing behaviour of workers and …rms. Unemployment bene…t payments to short-and long-term unemployed are …nanced by a tax rate on gross wages and by transfers from …rms. The labour tax implies that the net wage is w = (1 ) w gross . 7 The number of short-term unemployed workers is
is the number of the long-term unemployed. The budget constraint of the government therefore reads
6 Given our focus on individual search behaviour, we start at the individual level and then derive a matching function (see the discussion following (19)) rather than the other way round. Both ways are of course equivalent. 7 The transfers from …rms is a modelling device which makes sure that all …nancial ‡ows are taken into account as well. This makes our setup a true general equilibrium setup. More precisely speaking, the transfers amount to the di¤erence between aggregate pro…ts and aggregate vacency costs, (A w= (1 )) L M where M is the number of vacancies. Quantitatively speaking, is neglegibly small. It is only around 0.2% of total income of the government.
The government adjusts the wage tax such that this constraint holds at each point in time.
Optimal behaviour
Households are in…nitely lived and do not save. They have a strictly positive time preference rate : The present value of having a job is given by V (w) and depends on the current endogenous wage w only. Employed workers enjoy instantaneous utility u (w). The value V (w) is constant in a steady state as the wage is constant, but di¤ers across steady states. Whenever a worker loses his job, he enters the unemployment bene…t system by obtaining insurance payments b U I for the full length of s. Workers are immediately granted full bene…t entitlements, i.e. unemployment payments are not experience rated. See the bargaining setup for further discussion. Hence, the value of being unemployed when just having lost the job is given by V (b U I ; 0) where 0 stands for a spell of length zero. This leads to a Bellman equation for the employed worker of
The Bellman equation for the unemployed worker reads
(5) The instantaneous utility ‡ow of being unemployed, V (b (s) ; s) ; is given by three components. The …rst component shows the instantaneous utility resulting from consumption of b (s) and e¤ort (s). The second component is a deterministic change of V (b (s) ; s) as the value of being unemployed changes over time. The third component is a stochastic change that occurs at job-…nding rate ( (s) ; (s)) : When a job is found, an unemployed gains the di¤erence between the value of being employed V (w) and V (b (s) ; s).
An optimal choice of e¤ort (s) for (5) requires
where subscripts denote (partial) derivatives. It states that the expected utility loss resulting from increasing search e¤ort must be equal to expected utility gain due to higher e¤ort. We require that the value of unemployment an instant before becoming a long-term unemployed is identical to the value of being long-term unemployed at s, i.e.
The value of a job J to a …rm is given by instantaneous pro…ts A w= (1 ), which is the di¤erence between revenue A and the gross wage w= (1 ), reduced by the risk of being driven out of business
where > 0 stands for the interest rate (being identical to the discount rate of households) and where we anticipate that the value of a vacancy is zero.
Given that individual arrival rates are a functions of the individual unemployment spell, the expected rate of exit out of unemployment is just the mean over individual arrival rates, given the endogenous distribution of the unemployment spell f (s) from (2),
As a consequence, the vacancy …lling rate is 1 : The value of a vacant job is
With free entry, the value of holding a vacancy is J 0 = 0, leading to
We let wages be determined by Nash bargaining. We assume that the outcome of the bargaining process is such that workers receive a share of the total surplus of a successful match
. The total surplus is the gain of the …rm plus the gain of the worker from the match where the latter depends crucially on the outside option of the worker. The fact that we use V (b U I ; 0) as the outside option of the worker means that all workers (even if only working for an instant or, in the limit, if only bargaining) are entitled to full unemployment bene…ts, i.e. b U I over the full length s and b U A for s > s.
8 An alternative would consist in specifying V (b (s) ; s) as the outside option: if the bargain fails, the unemployed worker remains unemployed and continues to receive bene…ts she received before the unsuccessful bargaining. This would be theoretically interesting as an endogenous wage distribution would arise (see Albrecht and Vroman, 2005) where the distinguishing determinant across workers is the previous unemployment spell. Using an identical outside option for all individuals, however, has the advantage that all workers are homogenous. Once an unemployed …nds a job, all history is deleted, all workers are the same and, independently of their employment history, earn the same wage.
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Following the steps as in Pissarides (1985) , we end up with a generalized wage equation that reads (see app. B.1.1)
The left hand side corresponds to what in models with risk-neutrality and without taxation is simply the wage rate. If we had = 0 and u (w) = w, we would obtain just w on the left. Consequently, the worker is compensated for the outside option in the case of unemployment u (b U I ; (0)). The tax rate, that appears as the term w= (1 ), results from the instantaneous pro…t of a …rm (8) which needs to pay a gross wage of w= (1 ). The right hand side is a simple generalization of the standard wage equation of Pissarides (1985) . Instead of bene…ts for the unemployed (which we would …nd on the right for riskneutral households and no time-dependence of e¤ort), we have instantaneous utility from being unemployed. The impact of the production side is unchanged when compared to the standard wage equation.
Instead of specifying the outside option di¤erently, one could also allow for strategic bargaining. Many recent papers have used strategic bargaining given that either payo¤s change over time and Nash bargaining would correspond to myopic behaviour (Coles and Wright, 1998; Coles and Muthoo, 2003) , that a careful analysis of on-the-job search makes strategic bargaining more appropriate (Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006) or that unemployment does not have such a strong e¤ect on bargaining as generally thought (Hall and Milgrom, 2008) . 10 Brügemann and Moscarini (2007) …nd (for a di¤erent question) that the quantitative di¤erences between di¤erent wage-setting rules are small. Given that we want to focus here on the direct incentive e¤ects of non-stationary unemployment bene…ts on search e¤ort, we feel justi…ed to "switch o¤"the strategic channel and leave this for future work.
The insurance e¤ect
In addition to the incentive e¤ect of reforms, we would also like to understand the insurance e¤ect. In a world without moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance would require unemployment bene…ts equal to the net wage. With moral hazard, i.e. with e¤ort being a function of unemployment bene…ts, insurance consideration must take into account that e¤ort decreases in unemployment bene…ts.
We can easily understand whether the insurance e¤ect was taken into account in an appropriate way by computing expected utility of an individual which is "behind the veil of ignorance". This is similar in spirit to social welfare functions employed by Hosios (1990) or Flinn (2006) . One can alternatively look at this expected utility as average utility over all (employed and unemployed) workers. Expected utility EU is given by
It is computed by the share L=N of employed workers times their welfare V (w) plus the share (N L) =N of unemployed workers times the average welfare of an unemployed. This average is obtained by integrating over all spells s, where f (s) is the endogenous density (2), with exit rates ( (s) ; (s)) that follow from the steady state solution of the model, and the V (b i ; s) are the values of being unemployed with a spell s and bene…t payments b i from (1).
3 Equilibrium properties
Individual (un)employment probabilities
In models with constant job-…nding and separation rates, the unemployment rate can easily be derived by assuming that a law of large numbers holds. Aggregate employment dynamics can then be described by
L which allows to compute unemployment rates.
With spell-dependent e¤ort, individual arrival rates (:) are heterogeneous and employment dynamics need to be derived using techniques from the literature on Semi-Markov or renewal processes, e.g. Kulkarni (1995) or Corradi et al. (2004) . The generalization of Semi-Markov processes compared to continuous time Markov chains consists in allowing the transition rate from one state to another to depend on the time an individual has spent in the current state. We apply this here and let the transition rate from unemployment to employment depend on the time s the individual has been unemployed. Hence, switching from a constant job-…nding rate to a spell-dependent rate (s) implies switching from Markov to Semi-Markov processes. Processes are called "semi"as the historydependence of the job …nding rate (s) is not Markov. Processes are still called "Markov"as once an individual has found a job, history no longer counts. This is also why these processes are called renewal processes: whenever a transition to a new state occurs, the system starts from the scratch, it is "renewed"and history vanishes.
We start by looking at individual employment probabilities. Let p ij ( ; s (t)) describe the probability with which an individual, who is in state i (either e for employed or u for unemployed) today in t, will be in state j 2 fe; ug at some future point in time , given that his current spell is now s (t). These expressions read, starting with s (t) = 0 and taking into account that the separation rate remains constant (see app. A.5),
Expressions for complementary transitions are given by p ue ( ) = 1 p uu ( ) and p ee ( ) = 1 p eu ( ), respectively. These equations have a straightforward intuitive meaning. Consider …rst the case of being not very far in the future. Then all integrals (for = t) are zero and the probability of being unemployed at is, if unemployed at t; one from (13a) and, if employed at t, zero from (13b). For a > t; the part e R t (s(y))dy in (13a) gives the probability of remaining in unemployment for the entire period from t to : An individual unemployed today can also be unemployed in the future if he remains unemployed from t to v (the probability of which is e R v t (s(y))dy ), …nds the job in v (which requires multiplication with the exit rate (s (v))) and then moves from employment to unemployment again over the remaining interval v (for which the probability is p eu ( v)). As this path is possible for any v between t and ; the densities for these paths are integrated. The sum of the probability of remaining unemployed all of the time and of …nding a job at some v but being unemployed again at gives then the overall probability p uu ( ; 0) of having no job in when having no job in t: Note that there can be an arbitrary number of transitions in and out of employment between v and : The interpretation of (13b) is similar. The probability of remaining employed from t to v is simpler, e [v t] ; as the separation rate is constant. As we can see, these equations are interdependent: The equation for p uu ( ) depends on p eu ( v) and the equation for p eu ( ), in turn, depends on p uu ( v). Formally speaking, these equations are integral equations, sometimes called Volterra equations of the …rst type (13b) and of the second type (13a). Integral equations can sometimes be transformed into di¤erential equations, which will simplify their solution in practice. In our case, however, no transformation into di¤erential equations is known.
After having computed the probability of being unemployed in when being unemployed in t for individuals that just became unemployed in t, i.e. who have a spell of length s (t) = 0; we will need an expression for p uu ( ; s (t)). This means, we will need the transition probabilities for individuals with an arbitrary spell s (t) of unemployment. Luckily, given the results from (13a and b), this probability is straightforwardly given by
An unemployed with spell s (t) in t has di¤erent exit rates (s (y)) which, however, are known from our analysis of optimal behaviour at the individual level. Hence, only the integrals in (14) are di¤erent, the probabilities p eu ( v) can be taken from the solution of (13a and b).
Aggregate unemployment
Given our …nding in (13) and (14) on p eu ( ) and p uu ( ; s (t)), we can now compute the expected number of unemployed for any distribution of spell F (s),
Starting at the end of this equation, given there are L t employed workers in t, the expected number of unemployed workers at some future point out of the group of those currently employed in t is given by p eu ( ) L t : Again, one should keep in mind that the probability p eu ( ) allows for an arbitrary number of switches between employment and unemployment between t and ; i.e. it takes the permanent turnover into account. For the unemployed, we compute the mean over all probabilities of being unemployed in the future, if unemployed today, by integrating over p uu ( ; s (t)) given the current distribution F (s (t)) : Multiplying this by the number of unemployed today, N L t , gives us the expected number of unemployed at out of the pool of unemployed in t. The sum these two expected quantities gives the expected number of unemployed at some future point :
The expected unemployment rate at is simply the expression (15) divided by N: When we focus on a steady state, we let approach in…nity. In order to obtain a simple expression for the aggregate unemployment rate and to show the link to the textbook expression, we assume a pure idiosyncratic risk model where micro-uncertainty cancels out at the aggregate level. Hence, we assume a law of large numbers holds and the population share of unemployed workers equals the average individual probability of being unemployed. This "removes" the expectations operators, so that (15) for a steady state
We have replaced L = L t by the steady state employment level L and the individual probabilities by the steady state expressions p uu (s (t)) and p eu : The probability p eu is no longer a function of as this probability will not change in steady state, while there will always be a distribution of p uu (s), even in steady state.
Solving for the unemployment rates gives
where the second expression is more parsimonious. If we assumed a constant job arrival rate here, we would get p eu = p uu = = ( + ) and p ue = = ( + ). Inserting this into our steady state results would yield the standard expression for the unemployment rate, (N L) =N = = ( + ). In our generalized setup, the long-run unemployment rate is given by the ratio of individual probability p eu to be unemployed when employed today divided by this same probability plus 1
Functional forms and steady state
For estimation purposes and for the numerical solution, we need functional forms for the instantaneous utility function and for the arrival rate. We assume that the instantaneous utility function of an unemployed worker used e.g. in (5) is
E¤ort is measured in utility terms. 11 The utility function of an employed worker has the same structure only that consumption is given by w and there is no explicit e¤ort. One could therefore look at as a measure of the di¤erence between disutility from searching and disutility from work.
For reasons that will be discussed in the next section, let us express the spell-e¤ect as
The arrival rate of jobs ( (s) ; (s)) is assumed to obey
This speci…cation can easily be made plausible when linking it to a matching function. The matching function represents the aggregate arrival rate. Hence, it needs to equal the sum over individual arrival rates. De…ning
This shows that we succeed in identifying the elasticity of vacancies as we assume that both e¤ort and tightness have the same power in (19). The more appropriate interpretation for is therefore the elasticity of e¤ort.
In a steady state, all aggregate variables are constant and there will be a stationary distribution for unemployment spells. The solution of the steady state can most easily be found in two steps. Taking the wage w and labour market tightness as exogenous, one can use expressions related to the unemployed for e¤ort, the value of being unemployed and the value of a job, (b (s) ; s), V (b (s) ; s) and V (w) : Once these quantities are known, one can use the remaining equations of the model to solve for the wage rate and tightness, w and . In doing so, all other endogenous variables (exit rate (s) and the implied density f (s) ; instantaneous utilities u (:), the tax rate ; individual employment probabilities p ij and the implied number of short-and long-term unemployed and the unemployment rate (N L) =N , the number of vacancies, the value function J for the …rm and social welfare EU ) are determined as well.
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4 Structural estimation
Exit rates out of unemployment
Before we estimate the model using the data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we need to specify the functional forms for our spell-e¤ect (18).
14 In order to do so, we consider the distributional aspects of our data on the observed unemployment duration. The left panel of …g. 1 shows the nonparametric estimate of the hazard function from the entire sample of unemployment durations. The right panel of this …gure shows as the solid line the hazard function for the subsample of individuals with entitlement length equal to 12 months. The dashed line shows the hazard rate of those nonentitled to unemployment insurance b U I .
15 Both panels plot exit rates for the …rst 2.5 years of unemployment. From these …gures we can see a clear downward time dependence of the exit risk. On the one hand this may be the evidence of the true downward state dependence of an individual hazard rate (see e.g. van den Berg and van Ours, 1996, or Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995 , for the evidence of this). On the other hand, this may be due to some unobserved heterogeneity in the data (Heckman and Singer, 1984; van den Berg and van Ours, 1996) . Indeed, as far as German bene…t system is concerned there is at least one likely source of such unobserved heterogeneity. Namely, all individuals receiving UI bene…ts may or may not be eligible to UA 13 Appendix A.2 provides an explicit presentation of all equations (which above in the model description are given implicitly) and describes the solution procedure.
14 For more background on the SOEP, our sampling method and for descriptive statistics, see app. A.1. 15 See Tanner and Wong (1983) for the de…nition of the estimator and consistency proof. We use Gaussian kernel. Optimal bandwith is estimated by cross-validation discussed in Tanner and Wong (1984) . bene…ts, once the entitlement period expires. Eligibility to UA bene…ts is determined at the "means test", where an individual has to provide lengthy information about income sources of the household, number and age of dependents etc. If the means are su¢ cient, the person becomes ineligible to UA bene…ts, but might still claim social assistance, which eventually may or may not be provided. Unobservability, in our context, is in the fact that once exit out of unemployment occurs before the expiration of entitlement, an econometrician cannot know about the outcome of the means test. The individuals themselves, however, are very likely to know what the result of the test will be. So, in case they do not expect to pass the test, they would search harder and therefore exit faster. This behaviour, if uncontrolled for, results in a decreasing nonparametric estimate of the hazard rate. Clearly the true individual exit rate in this particular case may as well be constant, or increasing up to the expiration of entitlement and constant thereafter, as in Mortensen (1977) , van den Berg (1991) and also in our theoretical model. Finally, both true individual state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity may manifest themselves simultaneously (see e.g. van den Berg and van Ours, 1996 Ours, , 1999 , for evidence of this in U.S. and French data respectively).
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Thus the individual exit rate derived from the theoretical model must be su¢ ciently ‡exible to capture both of these aspects. It needs to have a parametric form ‡exible enough to replicate the observed downward pattern even if no unobserved heterogeneity is present. Simultaneously it needs to make provision for unobserved heterogeneity at least with respect to the outcome of the means test and match the observed downward pattern even if the true individual exit risks are increasing or constant. Our aim is to provide a fully structural econometric model that estimates the deep parameters of the theoretical model of Section 2 adequately addressing both above possibilities.
Econometric model

Speci…cation
Our data are sampled as a ‡ow of entrants into unemployment and employment. Therefore, exit rates contain all information necessary for the construction of the likelihood function. The exit rate from our theoretical model is given by (19). The e¤ort level (s) needs to be replaced by the optimal value implied by the …rst-order condition (6), i.e. (s) is a function of the duration s given the particular bene…t environment (insurance and assistance bene…ts together with the entitlement length), the spell-e¤ect (s), the wage w and labour market density . To stress this dependence but to keep notation short, we group these explanatory variables into a vector z fb U I ; b U A ; s; w; g and write = (s; z) in the econometric part of this paper. With respect to this group of variables it is …nally important to notice that even though w and are endogenous to the theoretical model they are exogenous to the duration of unemployment which is our dependent variable. Therefore one can either substitute them out using their theoretical solutions, which depend on the productivity A and vacancy costs among others, or one can use the data on w and directly. Using the data on w and directly simpli…es an already complex numerical task of …tting the nonstationary model considerably, making it faster by a factor of about 4. Moreover, it lifts the necessity of having employer-side data which are unavailable in SOEP as well as in any typical panel household survey.
Clearly, there also exist other variables that may potentially a¤ect both the e¤ort and the shape of the spell-e¤ect. We group these additional explanatory variables in a vector x that contains the rest of personal characteristics. We assume that these variables enter the exit rate to employment and the separation rate with corresponding parameters & and .
17 Hence, the separation rate now reads (x) and the spell-e¤ect (18) now reads (x;s) = 0 (x) g (s).
Summarizing, conditional on the vector of observed characteristics, the exit rate from (19) can be written as
For ease of distinction between short-term and long-term bene…t regimes, j indicates the regime before (j = 1) and after (j = 2) expiration of unemployment insurance payments.
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We have four di¤erent types of labour market trajectories in our data set. The …rst group consists of individuals who enter unemployment with the right to claim UI bene…ts and exit unemployment before the expiration of entitlement period (s s). As argued above, for these individuals we do not observe the outcome of the means test for eligibility to b U A . We do assume, however, that individuals know about the outcome even before applying for b U A : Therefore, let (s; zj0) indicate the search e¤ort given that b U A = 0, which corresponds to the hypothetical failure at the test. Similarly, let (s; zjb U A ) stand for the hypothetical case in which the test will be passed (and so, b U A > 0). Finally, let denote the fraction of the individuals that pass the test and denote the vector of all the parameters of interest. Then, for a single spell data, the individual log-contribution of this group is
where d u is a dummy variable such that d u = 1 if unemployment spell is uncensored. The second group comprises individuals who enter unemployment with the right to claim UI bene…ts, fail to …nd a job before entitlement expires, transit to either UA or zero bene…t level and thereby reveal the outcome of the means test, and exit unemployment (or not) only after the expiration of entitlement (s > s). The contribution of such individuals to the log-likelihood is given by
17 In principle, it would always be desireable to integrate some aspects of this ex ante heterogeneity into the theoretical model right from the beginning. Our objective, however, is to focus on the implications of a two-tier bene…t system under optimal e¤ort with anticipated end date of the entitlement. We therefore leave theoretical treatment of complementary ex ante heterogeneity for future research. It is standard in the literature to model the basic feature of optimal behaviour one is interested in and capture the rest of heterogeneity in the econometric part (see e.g. van den Berg and Ridder, 1998, or Flinn, 2006) .
18 Appendix A.3 shows the di¤erential equation that solves for j (s) once optimal search e¤ort is substituted out.
where d t is a dummy variable such that d t = 1 if we observe that an individual passes the means test.
The third group embarks all individuals who do not have the right to claim UI bene…ts and enter unemployment receiving lower UA bene…ts from the very beginning (d t = 1) or not receiving bene…ts at all (d t = 0). Their contribution to the log-likelihood is therefore
For our …nal group which consists of entrants to employment the log-contribution is simply
where d j is a dummy variable such that d j = 1 if employment spell is uncensored and l is the duration of employment.
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The parameterization for 0 (x) is the usual 0 (x) = e x 0 & , where intercept term is included in x. Similarly, the conditional rate of exit out of unemployment is parameterized as (x) = e x 0 . Our parametric assumptions about the shape of g (s) is
where S (s; ) denotes a survivor function of the chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom (see app. B.3.5). Intercept in x plays a role of a scaling parameter that adjusts g (s) appropriately. Our choice the particular form in (22) is motivated by the nonparametric estimates in …g. 1, where even in absence of unobserved heterogeneity the individual exit risk is well-matched by the reverse S-shaped curve. Sensitivity analysis with other parametric alternatives, e.g. the survivor function of the Weibull distribution, which has one parameter more, have shown no signi…cant improvement in the model …t. With these parametric form the entire vector of parameters to estimate …nally becomes = f ; ; ; ; &; g. It is possible to further argue that along with unobserved outcome of the means test there may potentially exist other unmeasured heterogeneity that enters x and therefore the model needs to be extended to account for it. As x determines both the transition rate to employment and the transition rate to unemployment, di¤erent aspects of this unmeasured heterogeneity may di¤erently in ‡uence the transitions to and from these states. Thus, in general, the distribution of unmeasured heterogeneity that a¤ects one of the exit rates should be correlated with the distribution of unmeasured heterogeneity that a¤ects the other (see e.g. van den Berg et al., 1994) . While not unthinkable, in our context it is quite di¢ cult to …t such an extended model even with the simplest two-point discrete distributions. More importantly, however, it is quite di¢ cult to perform comparative statics exercises taking this additional unobserved heterogeneity into account. For these reasons we for the moment refrain from building the additional unobserved heterogeneity into the econometric model.
Estimation procedure
Estimation of model parameters uses a part of the numerical solution method for the steady state. As described in app. A.2, for a given wage w and vacancy to unemployment ratio , the individual exit rate can be computed at any moment of the unemployment spell. Using individual survey data implies that the wage w for each individual is known and the corresponding can be taken from macro data. Thus for any given parameter vector and a prespeci…ed value for the time preference rate (0:003, corresponding to an annual interest rate of 3:7%) individual exit rates immediately follow. Details on the implementation can be found in app. B.3.7-A.3.
Note that is estimated without explicitly specifying the wage setting mechanism. If we used linked employer-employee data, the model could be estimated by using the observable productivity data. This would also allow us to estimate the bargaining power parameter as well as provide more information on the discrepancy between the observed wage and an endogenous wage solution implied by the model. For the rest of the parameters unrelated to wage setting mechanism, however, both approaches must be equivalent (assuming that wage setting in the second one is correctly speci…ed).
Identi…cation
Identi…cation of the model parameters comes from di¤erent sources. From (21d) we can see that separation rate parameters are always identi…ed from the data on the job duration l and observed individual characteristics.
To demonstrate identi…ability of 0 , and we need to consider the endpoint condition that pins down the path of the optimal exit rate at in…nity. This condition is shown in equation (A.9) in app. A.3 and corresponds to the exit rate in a completely stationary environment, where the two-step system and the exogenous spell-e¤ect have no impact anymore. From equation (A.9) we see that is identi…ed through the variation in bene…t level. For a …xed rate of time preference, and given the identi…ed , the middle term in this equation further suggests that wage variation will identify and 0 up to scaling, even if is a constant. From this follows that in the the solution for the exit rate 2 the unemployment duration, wage and bene…t data will identify 0 , and . Clearly, once 0 is identi…ed from the above listed data, the parameters & are always identi…ed from the observed individual characteristics.
Identi…cation of the exogenous spell-e¤ect comes from the optimal solution for the time path of exit rate j (s) itself. Consider this path, which is shown in equation (A.8), app. A.3. From the second term in this equation we see that the spell-e¤ect will always be identi…ed as long as _ (s) = (s) remains a time-dependent function, which is true for our speci…cation. Identi…cation of the particular parameters that describe the spell-e¤ect will depend on its parametric form. With our speci…cation in (22), is always identi…ed being just a single parameter.
Finally, the fraction of those who pass the means test is always identi…ed at least via observability of the outcome of this test in the subsample of individuals that fail to exit unemployment before the entitlement period is over, transiting to a lower-bene…t regime, and in the subsample of individuals with no entitlement to UI bene…ts. This is seen from (21b) and (21c).
Estimation results
The table below reports estimation results for the speci…cations that exclude (left panel) and include (right panel) observed individual characteristics. Numerical complexity of the model makes us restricting attention on only a small number of key characteristics, which are Sex (=1 if male), Region (=1 if an individual comes from East Germany) and Skill (=1 if an individual has a higher vocational or higher education according to ISCED-1997 As for the estimation results alone, our main …nding is the signi…cance of . This means that changes in the optimal e¤ort levels in response to any unemployment bene…t reform, be it the reform of b U I;U A or of s, will have a signi…cant impact on the exit rate out of unemployment. This …nding in particular contributes to the empirical reduced form literature that analyses the dependence between unemployment bene…ts and the probability of leaving unemployment. Evidence on this dependence are somewhat con ‡icting with earlier Hujer and Schneider (1989) and Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) …nding mostly no signi…cant in ‡uence of bene…ts and later Carling et al. (2001) and Røed and Zhang (2003) stating the opposite. 20 Rather than conducting a reduced form analysis, we address the same question form an entirely structural perspective, providing thereby an alternative view. While we do not rule out that for certain types of heterogeneous agents the change in bene…ts may play no role, our result on the signi…cance of shows that in su¢ ciently aggregate terms there exists a positive signi…cant relationship between the reemployment probability and any change in the level of unemployment bene…t payments. Consequently, any change in the design of unemployment bene…t mechanism will induce a signi…cant response on the macro level.
Our next important …nding is on the role of unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the outcome of means test. From tab. 1 we can see that is always signi…cant at 5% level. Together with signi…cance of this implies that the prospect of not passing the means test signi…cantly increases search e¤ort and exit probability. While importance of unmeasured heterogeneity is frequently highlighted in the literature on structural estimation of search models, much fewer attempts have been made to explicitly address the exogenous spell dependence. Since our model is nonstationary from the very beginning, accounting for this spell-dependence is particularly easy. From tab. 1 we can see that the estimate of is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. However, absence of exogenous spell dependence is not nested in our speci…cation, because (22) does not include time-invariance as a special case. Therefore the appropriate test for exogenous spell-dependence is the Vuong (1989) test for overlapping models, where spell-e¤ect in the competing model is absent, i.e. 0 (x;s) = 0 (x). Under null hypothesis of equivalence of two speci…cations the test statistic is distributed as a mixture of squared standard normal variates, which can be easily simulated. We …nd that in both unconditional and conditional models the hypothesis of absence of exogenous spell-dependence is clearly rejected. 21 This means that, once key unobserved component is accounted for, there still remains a signi…cant degree of downward state dependence among long-term unemployed. Coexistence of unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence aligns with the similar …nding of van den Berg and van Ours (1996, 1999) , who use an entirely di¤erent modelling approach.
Finally, our estimate of the utility parameter is also very comforting. First, the degree of risk aversion is high enough to reject the hypothesis of risk neutrality. Second, signi…cance of provides the empirical evidence on the existence of a signi…cant insurance e¤ect of a bene…t reform.
Regarding individual characteristics our results show a signi…cant e¤ect of these on job separation instances. All these e¤ects are of the correct sign. At the same time, only the bene…t scheme seems to be responsible for the exit from unemployment. From tab. 1 it is also easy to see that introduction of observed heterogeneity does not signi…cantly in ‡uence the size of the parameters that determine the shape of the structural hazard function (namely , , and ). Thus, if one is not interested in policy modelling on sub-population level, …tting the unconditional model (without x), and thereby substantially reducing the estimation time, could already be su¢ cient.
Finally, regarding the model …t, we plot the predicted survivor function for each speci…c sub-population against the Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimates of the survival probability in unemployment, including their 95% con…dence intervals. These plots can be seen in app. A.4, …g. 6 and 7. We can see that with two exceptions out of eight the model tends to fall short of the con…dence interval between the 3rd and the 6th months of unemployment duration. Responsible for this is most likely the neglected within-group heterogeneity for the high-educated West Germans and low-educated East Germans, as the corresponding blocks in …g. 6 and 7 suggest. While the …t can be further re…ned by treating this withingroup heterogeneity accordingly (and possibly introducing more unobserved heterogeneity, as discussed on p.16), our model still fairly accurately matches the survivor probability in the medium-to long-term unemployment, which was the primary target of the reform analyzed in this paper.
After having estimated all the parameters in we are left with determining labour productivity A and vacancy cost . The wage w and tightness were taken as exogenous in this …rst part of the estimation which was built on the household side of the model only. As the wage and tightness are endogenous in general equilibrium, we now take the estimated parameters and compute parameters A and using the full general equilibrium structure of our economy in the steady state. We compute A and such that the average wage in our sample result as general equilibrium endogenous variables in our model. See tab. 2 for results.
Evaluating the labour market reforms
In this chapter we use the structurally estimated parameters in order to describe the steady state equilibrium of 2004 and to evaluate the reforms e¤ective as of January 2005.
The pre-reform steady state
Data is heterogeneous in many respects and we have vectors of b U I;i ; b U A;i ; s i and the wage w i . Building on the mean wage (used above e.g. to predict A and ), UI payment for our representative agent is given by the replacement rate U I times the mean wage, corrected for the share ! of individuals who are entitled to UI payments, b U I = ! U I w. As only an estimated share of = 24:4% pass the means test (see tab. 1), UA payments for our representative agent are the product of the replacement rate U A , the previous wage and the share , b U A = U A w. The replacement rates we use are the averages over statuary replacement rates weighted by population size. 22 Average sample entitlement to UI payments is s = 12:18 months, again for those entitled to UI payments. With these means for b U A and s, our representative agent receives the same amount of bene…ts at each point in time s as the mean in the data over a cohort of unemployed who all have an unemployment spell of s (see app. B.4.1).
All parameters used in this paper apart from the ones presented in the tab. 1 plus some selected endogenous variables are provided in tab. 2. As in the estimation part, the time preference rate is chosen to …t an annual interest rate of 3:7%: The bargaining power is set equal to :5. As the conditional model dominates the unconditional model, we use these estimates from tab. 1 to predict the average separation rate and the parameter 0 in (19) and (20) for the spell-e¤ect. By average we understand the representative individual in our data set, i.e. 53% male and 42% living in East-Germany. The corresponding separation rate , 0 and the implied mean exit rate can be seen in tab. 2.
23 22 When x% in our sample receive a U I of 67% and the rest receives 60%, the replacement rate we use is x%67% + (1 x%) 60%:
23 Results for the unconditional model or for male and female workers di¤er by around 0.1%. Our equilibrium values …t perfectly by construction for the wage and labour market tightness. Our tax rate is su¢ ciently close to the actual social security contribution rate (this is the only purpose of taxes in our model). Given the average matching rate of 0:10 and the unemployment rate of 10:3%, our pre-reform steady state re ‡ects the situation in Germany before January 2005 relatively well.
For comparative statics below, we will take the exogenous parameters, the estimated and the predicted parameters and the replacement rate for short-term unemployed U I as given. We will then change long-term bene…ts b U A and the entitlement period s to understand the e¤ects on equilibrium values. (18) with (22) falls over time. The value of being unemployed thereby unambiguously falls over time. This is shown by the upper right panel and needs to hold generally as (A.2) in the appendix shows. The intuition is simple: If there was no spell-e¤ect ( (s) is constant), a long-term unemployed would live in a stationary world and the value of being a long-term unemployed would be stationary as well. With a negative spell-e¤ect, the job …nding rate -taking optimally chosen e¤ort into account -goes down and the value of being unemployed approaches a lower limit determined by the lower limit of (s).
The optimal reaction of the unemployed worker is shown by the lower left panel. E¤ort increases during the …rst 9 months but then starts falling before entitlement to unemployment insurance ceases at s = 12:2 months. Optimal e¤ort is the outcome of the interplay of the spell-e¤ect (lower (s) reduces optimal e¤ort) and the incentive-e¤ect, i.e. the potential gain from …nding a job. As gains increase due to a falling value of being unemployed, this second e¤ect tends to increase e¤ort. This can be seen from the …rst-order condition in (6) or, more directly, from (A.1) in the appendix. The initial increase of e¤ort clearly re ‡ects the rising incentive to search harder the closer s: After around 9 months, however, the increase in the gain of …nding a job is no longer strong enough to compensate the "discouraging" spell-e¤ect. Search e¤ort falls and approaches a constant. The fact that unemployed workers …nally "give up"is ultimately the e¤ect of the exogenous negative spell-e¤ect.
The exit rate shows paths for b U A = 0; average b U A and b U A = b U I : Average b U A is the one in our pre-reform steady state, we will return to the other ones in our analysis of the reform.
The e¤ects of the reform
Labour market reforms were characterized by a reduction in UA bene…ts b U A and entitlement length s. Bene…ts decreased on average by 7%; average entitlement length dropped from 12.2 to 11.4 months, i.e. by 6:6%: We present here the e¤ect of the reform, i.e. a joint decrease of both b U A and s: Afterwards, we will brie ‡y discuss which of the e¤ects is the stronger one, both in a quantitative and qualitative way. For more details, see Launov and Wälde (2010) .
The horizontal axis of …g. 3 plots "Hartz-units". The "1"represents the situation before the reform. The "0" represents the situation after the reform and "-1" to "-4" shows the e¤ects of stronger reforms, i.e. of reducing b U A by another 7% and s by another 6.6%. The vertical axes plot changes relative to the pre-reform steady state which is normalized (levels were reported in tab. 2 above) to 1. The pre-reform steady state is therefore always given by the point (1; 1) : The solid line shows the changes as predicted by our estimated model. The dashed lines above and below provide a 95% con…dence interval for the statistic in the middle. This con…dence interval is constructed using parametric bootstrap where draws are made from the multivariate normal distribution of the maximum likelihood estimates. For every new draw we recompute the equilibrium solution at each Hartz-unit. Due to the high numerical complexity of the equilibrium solution, con…dence intervals at each Hartz-unit are currently based on 80 replications.
Concerning results, we …nd -generally speaking -very weak e¤ects of the reform. The qualitative e¤ects of the reform are as intended by policy makers. E¤ort (0) when becoming unemployed rises the stronger the reform, i.e. the further we are to the right of the upper left …gure. Labour market tightness and the average job …nding rate from (9) rise as well. The increase in ; i.e. the number of vacancies per unemployed worker, is pretty important for what follows. Understanding this e¤ect is simple, however: More e¤ort by unemployed workers makes opening a vacancy more attractive. Hence, lower bene…ts induce a higher number of vacancies per unemployed worker. The quantitatively weak e¤ect of the reform becomes visible when looking at the unemployment rate. It decreases from the pre-reform steady state "1"to the reform level at "0"to (more than) 97% only. Starting at an unemployment rate of around 10.4%, the e¤ect of the reform would be to decrease the unemployment rate to 10.1%, i.e. by 0.3 percentage points only. The lower …gures show that the tax rate falls. This has various reasons: Lower bene…t payments and a lower number of recipients reduce overall expenditure. This reduced expenditure is paid by more workers who earn higher gross wages.
One of the most surprising results is the increase in the net and gross wage. This increase is also the basis for the rise in social welfare which we will discuss later. The increase in the net wages becomes clear from the wage equation (11) when taking into account that the positive tightness e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ort e¤ect. This is an interesting feature of this wage bargaining setup with endogenous e¤ort and is in strong contrast to perfectly competitive setups, to bargaining setups with exogenous e¤ort and to search setups where the reservation wage is a simple decreasing function of the outside option. Here, the outside option (utility from being an unemployed worker) decreases as well but this is overcompensated by the positive e¤ect of more vacancies per unemployed worker.
Con…dence intervals for all the statistics in …g. 3 show that the changes induced by the reform are statistically signi…cant, as both the upper and the lower bound lie strictly above (or strictly below) unity. Summarizing and ignoring distributional e¤ects, the reform has the qualitatively desired e¤ects but is quantitatively of hardly any importance: While the reduction of unemployment is statistically signi…cant, economically, it is not.
When we look at welfare measures in …g. 4, we see the distributional nature of the reform. Employed workers gain from the reform. This might not appear surprising given that the net wage rises. Employed workers do also anticipate, however, the potential loss from the reform as they have a certain risk of becoming unemployed. If the value of being unemployed falls, the value of having a job could fall as well.
When we look at the value of being unemployed at s = 0; i.e. right after having lost the job, this value slightly increases as well due to the reform. This is entirely due to the anticipation e¤ect of having a job. The short-term unemployed clearly loses as bene…ts will fall earlier and by more due to the reform. But the short-term unemployed also gains as he will gain more due to the reform in case he …nds a job. More formally, the value of unemployment depends negatively on search e¤ort and positively on exit rate, which can be seen from equations (5) and (17). As both search e¤ort and the exit rate go up, each e¤ect could dominate. In our case, the positive exit-rate e¤ect is the stronger one for the short-term unemployed. For the long-term unemployed worker, to the contrary, the value of having been unemployed for one year falls due to the reform.
Considering the 95% con…dence intervals for each of these three statistics, though, we can see that despite the predicted wins and losses, all these wins and losses are not statistically signi…cant. The con…dence bounds lie above and below unity. What is signi…cant, however, are the losses of the …rms, i.e. a drop of J when bene…ts b U A are reduced.
The loss of …rms is a surprising qualitative result of our analysis and is a direct consequence of the rise in the gross wage. Rewriting (8) slightly shows that the value of the …rm J decreases in the gross wage, hence …rms dislike the reform. Is this a strong disadvantage of our model given that employers generally were in favour of the reform in public discussions? We do not think so. The wage can rise or fall in our theoretical setup. Whether the worse outside option of employed workers reduces the wage more than the higher job-…nding rate due to higher is theoretically an open question. Given our estimates, the " -e¤ect" dominates. While …rms urged the unemployed to search harder and the government to pay them lower bene…ts, they might not have seen that higher vacancies per unemployed worker …nally makes workers stronger, wages rise and pro…ts fall. What is also surprising -despite the lack of statistical signi…cance -is that overall welfare increases. We measure welfare as in (12). It is identical to expected utility of a worker who does not yet know in which state he is. Apparently, the gains of employed workers and of short-term unemployed workers are stronger than the losses of long-term unemployed workers.
Understanding the e¤ects of the reform
The magnitude of the e¤ects Generally speaking, we …nd very weak e¤ects of any type of reform. This can be made plausible with a back-of-the-envelope calculation. As the unemployment rate is approx. 10% and only 1/3 becomes long-term unemployed, only 3.3% of the entire labour force are a¤ected. In an intertemporal sense, income is reduced only during 3.3% of ones' lifetime. The duration of unemployment insurance payments is reduced by 6:6%; the level of the payments by 7%: Let this add up -to make this simple -to 14%. Figure 5 The e¤ect of economic growth (left panel) and the pure insurance e¤ect of the reform for employed, short-term and long-term unemployed workers (right panel)
The most surprising result of our analysis is that workers as a whole gain. This is surprising as one would expect that the insurance mechanism of unemployment bene…t payments is reduced following the reduction in b U A : Remember that a world without moral hazard unemployment bene…ts should equal the net wage. Given that a reduction in the length s and the level b U A of unemployment bene…ts moves our economy further away from this setup, one should expect that the insurance mechanism is reduced. Why is it then that social welfare increases?
To understand this, we divide the e¤ects of the reform into two partial e¤ects. The …rst partial e¤ect is the e¤ect on social welfare when e¤ort and the gross wage are held constant. What would happen if a reduction in b U A implies a reduction in the tax and thereby an increase in the net wage w? The result of this thought-experiment is given in the following …gure.
The horizontal axis plots the same Hartz-steps as in previous …gures. We clearly see that expected utility falls for worker groups when e¤ort is not a¤ected by bene…t levels. This clearly re ‡ects that in a world with constant e¤ort, unemployment bene…ts should equal the net wage. Any departure from this equality reduces expected utility.
The same result holds when we allow e¤ort to be a function of bene…ts, i.e. we allow incentives of the reform to play a role. The …gure shows (the three dashed lines) that welfare decreases less (as incentives are now improved) but welfare still falls.
As we know that welfare rises in the full general equilibrium, we can conclude that all bene…cial e¤ects of the reform come from the increase in the wage due to the higher number of vacancies per unemployed worker. This stresses the importance of two points: Academically speaking, an evaluation of labour market reforms should be undertaken in general equilibrium to provide a complete picture of the e¤ects. More importantly, the Hartz reforms did decrease the insurance mechanism implied by unemployment bene…ts but -in the end -this was bene…cial to the average worker. No need to stress that a more intelligent design of the reform which implies a Pareto-improvement would have been desirable.
Conclusion
Our project started by inquiring about the e¤ects of the Hartz IV labour market reforms on incentives and insurance mechanisms for the workforce. On a macro level, these questions inquire into the e¤ects on the unemployment rate and social welfare. We have developed an estimable search and matching model with endogenous e¤ort under time-dependent unemployment bene…ts. The main extension compared to the existing search and matching literature is the endogenous distribution of unemployment duration that arises due to individual choice of search intensity in a nonstationary environment. A link between these micro-dynamics and macro quantities like the unemployment rate was developed using tools from the literature on Semi-Markov processes. The theoretical model provides the density of unemployment duration of an individual being a function of various model parameters. This density provides the basis for structural estimation via maximum likelihood. General equilibrium policy analyses were performed using the parameter estimates of the best …tting speci…cation.
We …nd that the unemployment rate did decrease due to the reform. Unemployed workers have stronger incentives to search hard. The reduction of the unemployment rate was quantitatively very small, however. While statistically signi…cant, the reduction amounts to 0.3% only. Concerning insurance mechanisms, we …nd that employed workers and short-term unemployed win but long-term unemployed lose. These results are not statistically signi…-cant, however. We also …nd -much to our own surprise and in contrast to the perception of the public -that generally speaking social welfare increases! As our economy is populated by workers only, this means that workers as a whole gain through the reform.
Looking into the mechanisms in more detail, we …nd that the gain in social welfare is not due to an improvement in the insurance mechanism. The Hartz IV reform clearly reduced expected utility of a worker -keeping the gross wage constant. As Hartz IV reforms did have general equilibrium e¤ects as well, however, expected utility of a worker did increase as the wages increased. Summarizing, while workers need to search harder, this higher search e¤ort induces …rms to open new vacancies. Firms do this so much that the net and gross wage, overall utility for workers and social welfare increases.
These …ndings clearly give rise to new research questions: Could the reform have been designed in a Pareto-improving way? The old and the low-skilled, i.e. the long-term unemployed, they clearly lose through the reform. Can overall e¢ ciency gains be justi…ed if they are at the cost of one group? There is also a methodological question which should be treated in future work: Are our welfare …ndings too optimistic given that we have a ex-ante representative consumer? What if we had ex-ante heterogeneity in skill levels? One would expect that social welfare gains would not be as large. All of this is left for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Data
The data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a panel surveying households on an annual basis. The survey is coordinated by the Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin, see www.gsoep.de).
We draw a ‡ow sample of entrants to employment and unemployment at each month of years 1997-98. The choice of the year of sampling is determined by the fact that no changes to either bene…t level or entitlement length were made between the 1st of January 1997 and the 1st of January 2005, when Hartz IV reform came into power. With December 2003 being the latest month of our observation period we end up with a sample that describes a stationary entitlement-bene…t environment and provides a fairly reliable information on long-term unemployment (only 9.12% of unemployment durations in our sample are rightcensored). For each entrant we retrieve the duration of stay in the current state since the moment of entry. Following van den Berg and Ridder (1998) , p.1194, we refrain from considering individuals that allow transitions to the states other than full-time employment or unemployment within the above de…ned 01.97-12.98 window.
Units of measurement are months for the duration data and Euros for the wage and bene…ts data. Wage is the average monthly wage for the months of employment within a year prior to job loss, as these are the wage bases that conform with the observed bene…t levels. Price base is that of 1997. Descriptive statistics can be found in tab. 3. It is important to notice that GSOEP data do not contain information on the length of entitlement to UI bene…ts. There exist, however, strict and relatively simple rules that allow computing the length of entitlement once we know the length of previous job durations and the age of an individual. For this reason, for every person that enters unemployment we also have to retrieve his/her previous job history. In addition to that, previous job history provides us with the record of the latest wages earned.
The mean of the vacancy-unemployment ratio between 1997 and 1999 in Germany is about 0:3 (iab-data, adjusted for underreporting).
A.2 Steady state solution
We solve for the steady state of the model by separating the model into two "blocks".
Block 1: Household behaviour
Given the functional forms for utility and the spell-e¤ect in (17) and (19), the …rst-order condition for e¤ort (6) reads
(A.1)
It holds for both short-and long-term unemployed. Plugging this into the Bellman equation for the unemployed (5) and expressing it as a di¤erential equation in s gives
which is again valid for both short-and long-term unemployed. As the value of being unemployed an instant before and an instant after becoming a long-term unemployed is identical, we impose V (b U I ; s) = V (b U A ; s) when solving this di¤erential equation. Finally, since for an in…nite unemployment spell, the spell-e¤ect in (19) becomes a constant, lim where (0) is the optimal search e¤ort at the instant of entry into unemployment, which is given from (A.1). The above two equations require the average exit rate and the tax rate . The average rate is given by (9) which can easily be computed given that, after having solved block 1, the exit rates (:) are known from (19) and the density f (s) can therefore be computed from (2). The tax rate makes the government budget constraint (3) hold and is given by Given the density f (s), one can compute the number of short-term and long-term unemployed on the right-hand side of this expression from U short = (N L) R s 0 f (s) ds and U long = N L U short . The number of unemployed in turn follows from (16), using (13a,b) and (14) which we can now solve, given again that exit rates are known from block 1. Hence, we are basically left with (A.5) and (A.6) to determine the missing endogenous variables w and : After having solved block 1 with a guess of w and ; we verify whether this guess ful…lls (A.5) and (A.6). If not, we (matlab) adjusts the guess until we …nd a solution.
Appendix B.4.3 describes the numerical implementation in matlab. Appendix B.3.7 describes the numerical implementation for the estimation procedure.
A.3 Transition rates to employment
Transition rates to employment are fully described by the optimal search e¤ort. Using …rst order condition for search e¤ort (6) and the de…nition of the exit rate (19) we can therefore express value of unemployment as a function of the optimal exit rate. Inserting this value of unemployment into the Bellman equation for the unemployed (5) and expressing it as a di¤erential equation in s we obtain the time path of the optimal exit transition rate to employment as a result (see app. B.3.3 for derivation). Omitting individual characteristics for brevity, the di¤erential equation that describes the exit rate to employment both for the short-term and the long-term unemployed workers is for the …rst regime at s = s. Once wages and market tightness are observed from the data, V (w) can be obtained from the solution to block 1 in app. A.2. Consequently, under assumption that observed w and are the direct results of the solution to block 2 in app. A.2, we can compute the equilibrium exit rates to without requiring employer-side data.
A.4 Estimated and predicted survivor functions
Here we show the predicted survivor functions for heterogeneous population groups (solid line everywhere). Along with model predictions we plot the Kaplan-Meier survivor probabilities (zero markers) with corresponding 95% con…dence intervals (dash lines connecting the triangles). We now need to adjust the notation such that it suits our purposes. We look at a worker who just moved in t (like today) into either employment e or unemployment u. De…ne Q eu ( ) as the probability that a worker who just found a job in t "jumps"to u in a period of time shorter or equal to t. With a duration s dependent arrival rate (s (v)) ; this is then simply given by Q eu ( jt e ) = 1 e R t (s(v))dv ; (A.13)
where s (v) = v t is the duration in her current state. In perfect analogy and using a spelldependent arrival rate (s (v)), we get Q ue ( ) = 1 e R t (s(v))dv . For the complementary events -remaining in a given state -the probabilities are simply Q ee ( ) = 1 Q eu ( ) and Q uu ( ) = 1 Q ue ( ) : The probabilities that a transition takes place at all in this two state process are Q e ( ) Q eu ( ) ; Q u ( ) Q ue ( ) : (A.14)
With two possible states, we have four transition probabilities for the future: an unemployed (employed) person can either be unemployed or employed at some future point in time
. Two are redundant as the probability of e.g. an unemployed worker of being employed is complementary to the probability of being unemployed, p ue ( ) = 1 p uu ( ) ; and similarly p ee ( ) = 1 p eu ( ) : Hence, we only focus on p uu ( ) and p eu ( ) : These probabilities are, using the general equation (A.12),
These equations can be most easily be understood by looking at the following …gure. Let's consider p uu ( ) : An individual unemployed in t can be unemployed in by always remaining unemployed. This is the term 1 Q u ( ) : The individual can be unemployed in by remaining unemployed until v where she jumps into employment, the density for which is dQ ue (vjt u ) =dv: After v; the probability of returning to unemployment in the remaining time span of v is p eu ( v) : Note that this probability includes an arbitrary number of transitions larger than zero in this remaining period v: In contrast to integrating over x as in (A.12), we integrate over the point in time v here simply as this is the more intuitive way.
